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TO Nam Toan, Kazumasa OZAWA 
University of Tokyo 
 
ABSTRACT: One of the issues to successfully apply the BOT project is that must have an adequate pro-
curement strategy or procedure. Differently with traditional projects, procurement procedures for BOT pro-
jects will be influenced by a variety of factors, including the host country’s existing legislation governing 
public procurement of construction work, internationally accepted rules for public procurement, the business 
environment, the overall infrastructure policy and the nature of the particular BOT project. The purpose of 
this paper is to compare the practical implementation of BOT competitive procurement procedure in two se-
lected Asian countries, Hong Kong and Philippines, which have some successful implementation of competi-
tive tendering for BOT projects. The findings from the comparison would be helpful for other countries 
when formulating or revising the BOT procurement systems.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In the mid-1980s, many Asian countries turned to 
privatization of infrastructure to overcome problems 
which threatened to constrain economic growth. 
Getting private sector management and capital into 
transport, power, water and sewage, and telecommu-
nications services, was seen as a way of obtaining 
and maintaining infrastructure more quickly and 
more cheaply than traditional, state-led methods. 
Various privatization methods such as corporations, 
public flotations and straightforward sell-offs of 
state-owned enterprises, became a popular option in 
Asian countries. One important approach for build-
ing new infrastructure facilities was the 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) concept (Handley 
1997). 
 
One of the issues for successful BOT scheme is to 
have an adequate procurement strategy or procedure. 
Differently with traditional projects, procurement 
procedures for BOT projects will be influenced by a 
variety of factors, including the host country’s exist-
ing legislation governing public procurement of con-
struction work, internationally accepted rules for 
public procurement, the business environment, the 
overall infrastructure policy and the nature of the 
particular BOT project (UNIDO 1996). 
 
In order to formulate an efficient procurement 
framework for BOT projects, several researches 
(Zhang 2004, 2005; Kumarawamy and Zhang 2001) 
as well as guidelines (UNIDO 1996, WB 1998) in-
dicate that the competitive tendering system is suit-
able method to improve the efficiency of procure-
ment systems of BOT projects. 
  
The experiences of Asian countries indicate that they 
develop the procurement systems of BOT projects 
based on the trial-and-error exercises (Kumaras-
wamy et al. 2002). This suggests the usefulness of 
learning from the successful “trials” so as to mini-
mize any further “errors” in developing the future 
procurement systems of BOT projects. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the practical 
implementation of BOT competitive procurement 
procedure in two selected Asian countries, Hong 
Kong and Philippines, which have some successful 
implementation of competitive tendering for BOT 
projects. 
 
2. BOT COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT 
PROCEDURE 
 
Based on the basic procedure for procuring BOT 
projects as guideline of UNIDO (1997) and competi-
tive tendering process of BOT projects introduced by 
Tiong and Alum (1997), the BOT competitive pro-
curement procedure is shown in Figure 1. 
 
In Hong Kong, there is no legislation specifically 
dealing with BOT projects as a group; specific 
schemes have to be submitted by the government to 
the legislative council for approval, and a special 
ordinance needs to be promulgated for each particu-
lar scheme. Almost of BOT projects in Hong Kong 
are projects in transport sector such as Cross Har-
bour Tunnel (CHT), Eastern Harbour Crossing 
(EHC), Tate’s Cairn Tunnel (TCT), Western Harbour 
Crossing (WHC), and Route 3 Country Park Sec-
tions (R3CPS). These projects were awarded through 
competitive tendering even either solicited or unso-
licited projects. 
 
Unlike Hong Kong, the Philippines have passed the 
BOT Law in 1990, the first of its kind in Asia. Then, 
in 1994, the BOT Law was revised for increasing of 
the number of variants to 14 variants of the BOT 
scheme. To date, there are 70 BOT projects in energy, 
telecom, transport, and water and sewerage sector 
(PPI database). Following the BOT Law, the BOT 
project could be provided through three forms of 
solicitation: direct negotiation, competitive tendering, 
or unsolicited proposals. The competitive tendering 
is required for the projects that have more than one 
bidder participate in the case of solicited proposals, 
or more than one proposal for the same or similar 
project in the case of unsolicited projects. 
 
 
Figure 1 Stages in a BOT competitive procurement 
procedure 
 
The overview of BOT competitive procurement pro-
cedure in Hong Kong and Philippines are summa-






Creation of a procurement 
committee 
Preparation of tender  
documents 
Invitation and instruction to 
tenderers 
Tendering and evaluation of 
tenders 
Negotiation 
Awarding of project 
Pre-qualification 
Table 1 Overview of BOT competitive procurement procedure in Hong Kong and Philippines 






Unsolicited Proposals (many) 
Committee Financial and General Panel 
Land and Engineering Panel 
Traffic and Transportation Panel 
Agency officer; legal, technical, financial, 
and management officers; private sector, 




(1) to explain the government’s general 
requirements with respect to the project 
and the franchise, and to provide relevant 
information; (2) to provide guidance in 
the preparation of tenders and explain the 
tender evaluation criteria; and (3) to set 
out in detail the government’s require-
ments in design, construction, operation, 
and maintenance concerning the project 
and the franchise 
(1) instruction to bidders such as general 
description and objectives of the project, 
contractual arrangement, and evaluation 
method and evaluation criteria; (2) mini-
mum design, performance stan-
dard/specification, and economic parame-
ters; (3) draft contract; and (4) bid form. 
Pre-qualification N/A Prequalification with legal requirement, 




All interested tenderers Pre-qualified tenderers 
Tendering and 
Evaluation 
Single stage, one envelope procedure 
Sealed-bid 
Tenderers can submit more than one pro-
posals 
Kepner-Tregoe evaluation method 
Key evaluation criterion is lowest tariff 
(franchise period fixed, 30 years) 
Single stage, two-envelope procedure 
Selaed-bid 
Tenderers can only submit one proposal 
 
Two-envelope evaluation method 
Key evaluation criteria and franchise pe-
riod depend the nature of project 
Negotiation Negotiate with preferred tenderer(s) N/A 
Awarding pro-
ject 
Project Ordinance  Project Agreement 
Unsolicited pro-
posals treatment 
Submit to competitive tendering Swiss challenge 
 
3. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION 
 
Commonly, the projects are identified by the Gov-
ernment Agencies. Hong Kong’s BOT projects are 
good example with a thorough and effective process 
being led by the Government. Such as in transport 
sector, there are a series of Comprehensive Trans-
portation Studies, updated every five years. These 
determine future strategy as well as future projects. 
Projects can also be identified by the private sector, 
unsolicited projects, but almost of BOT projects in 
Hong Kong are solicited projects. However, one 
main issue with Hong Kong’s project identification 
is a lack of suitable projects for future BOT projects. 
Past experience of BOT tunnel projects indicates that, 
if the present toll systems and free routes are main-
tained, such as R3CPS has two alternative routes – 
the Tuen Mun Road and the Yuen Long Highway – 
which are free, the private sector may have little in-
terest in new BOT highway or tunnel projects. This 
issue requires the Hong Kong government identify 
the future BOT project based on a Long-term master 
plan. 
 
In Philippines, implementing agencies (ministries, 
local governments, and government owned and con-
trolled corporations) designate the projects that cor-
respond to the government’s medium-term public 
investment programs as “priority projects”. The pro-
jects will be then submitted to the relevant develop-
ment council – according to project cost. One issue 
in Philippines’ project identification is because im-
plementing agencies, especially local government, 
often lack experience in carrying out feasibility 
studies, they often welcome unsolicited proposals in 
which private sector entities have already done it for 
them, particularly in the power sector. The main is-
sues against unsolicited projects are the lack of com-
petition. 
 
The treatment of unsolicited projects in Hong Kong 
and Philippines will be discussed in further section. 
 
The lesson experience in this stage is that govern-
ment should carefully prepare the project to attract 
private investors by BOT scheme. 
 
4. CREATION OF A PROCUREMENT COM-
MITTEE 
 
Generally, one agency will be established by gov-
ernment to conduct the procurement of BOT project. 
In Hong Kong, the tender process will be monitored 
by the Central Tender Broad and the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) which has 
played a major role over many years in minimizing 
corruption levels in Hong Kong. To evaluate the 
tender proposals, in case of transport sector, the gov-
ernment setups a tender evaluation committee, which 
is under leadership of the Secretary for Transport and 
includes three panels: financial and general, land and 
engineering, and operation and transportation. Mem-
bers of each panel come from relevant government 
policy branches and departments that are assisted by 
legal, technical, and financial consultants where ap-
propriate. Each panel is responsible for its own area 
of expertise assesses whether the submitted tender 
proposals can meet the government’s requirements. 
 
In Philippines, one Pre-qualification, Bids and 
Awards Committee (PBAC) will be created as re-
quirement in BOT Law including one chairman is at 
least a third ranking officer of the Agency; the mem-
bers who are legal, technical, financial, and man-
agement officers; and other observers from private 
sector, Commission on Audit, BOT center, and local 
agency. 
 
5. PREPARATION OF TENDER DOCU-
MENTS 
 
Good experience in preparation of tender documents 
from Hong Kong and Philippines is well standardi-
zation of tender documents by government agencies. 
 
In Hong Kong, the government agencies have pre-
pared a detailed project brief as part of tender docu-
ments to provide usefully and clearly information to 
tenderers: (1) to explain the government’s general 
requirements with respect to the project and the fran-
chise, and to provide relevant information; (2) to 
provide guidance in the preparation of tenders and 
explain the tender evaluation criteria; and (3) to set 
out in detail the government’s requirements in design, 
construction, operation, and maintenance concerning 
the project and the franchise. 
 
In Philippines, the tender document and the draft of 
project agreement have been also prepared to pro-
vide tender information to potential tenderers. In 
general, the Philippines tender documents provide to 
potential tenderers the following: (1) instruction to 
bidders such as general description and objectives of 
the project, contractual arrangement, and evaluation 
method and evaluation criteria; (2) minimum design, 
performance standard/specification, and economic 
parameters; (3) draft contract; and (4) bid form. 
 
6. PRE-QUALIFICATION AND INVITATION 
TO TENDERERS  
 
In Hong Kong, it is not the practice to carry out pre-
qualification of BOT tenderers. The invitation to 
tender for a BOT project is announced in the news-
papers and interested tenderers are generally given a 
period of 3-4 months to prepare detailed submissions. 
The reason to cancel the pre-qualification stage in 
Hong Kong, as the explanation of Tiong and Alum 
(1997), because the government believe that the 
scale of investments required for BOT projects and 
the keen competition will deter small companies 
from submitting proposals. Instead, it will attract 
only serious promoters who are financially strong. 
 
In practice, the evidence from Hong Kong’s experi-
ence is that the tender have attracted very strong 
concessionaires and contractors – giving Govern-
ment confidence that they will deliver on the very 
demanding projects offered (ADB 2000). 
 
Unlike Hong Kong, Philippines government require 
the pre-qualification to shortlist the potential tender-
ers. To participate the tender, the interested tenderers 
must be passed the legal requirements, experience or 
track record, and financial capability required in 
BOT Law. Only the pre-qualified tenderers will be 
invited to submit the proposals. 
 
Lesson experience from Philippines as well as rec-
ommendation from guidelines (UNIDO 1996, WB 
1998) is that the government should use prequalifi-
cation stage to limit the total number of prequalified 
tenderers to a shortlist of three or four, because the 
costs associated with more tenderers often exceed 
the benefits of additional competition. A large num-
ber of bidders reduces the chances each has of win-
ning the bid and hence discourages investment in the 
preparation of proposals. More bidders also raise 
costs to government since officials and their advisers 
will usually face more requests for clarification or 
additional information, and more bids will have to be 
evaluated. 
 
In Hong Kong, starting from R3CPS project, there 
was a little change in tendering process in that Hong 
Kong government first issued a request for expres-
sion of interest, and then issued a detailed project 
brief only to the interested parties.      
 





In the two countries, tenderers are typically given 4 
months to submit their bids. At the time of open bid-
ding, Hong Kong and Philippines use the same 
sealed-bid procedure. This procedure usually uses by 
other government than the other that is open bids or 
voice auction. The World Bank Guidelines (1998) 
given the reasons to use this procedure that are: first, 
collusion between bidders is generally considered to 
be less likely with sealed bids than voice auctions; 
under a sealed-bid procedure, bidders' defections 
from collusive agreements (that is, the submission of 
bids above the colluded price) are harder for others 
to prevent than under voice auctions; and second, if 
bidders are inexperienced, they may be less likely to 
correct for the winner's curse under a sealed-bid with 
the result that the sealed-only bid procedure may 
actually yield a higher price under these circum-
stances. 
 
Hong Kong and Philippines also use the same single 
stage of tendering. However, while Hong Kong uses 
one-envelope procedure – technical and financial 
proposal in one sealed envelope, Philippines use 
two-envelope procedure, the first is technical enve-
lope and the second is financial envelope. Therefore, 
in Philippines the prequalified tenderers must submit 
their bids in 2 separate sealed envelopes, the first 
being the technical proposal and the second being 
the financial proposal. At the date and time of bid 
opening, the technical proposal envelope will be 
opened and then evaluated. Once the tenderers who 
have qualified for the financial evaluation have been 
determined, they will be notified the date and time of 
the opening of the financial proposal envelopes. 
 
To encourage the innovation of private sector as well 
as the competition in tendering, Hong Kong gov-
ernment permits the tenderers to submit more than 
one proposal while BOT Law does not allow that. 
 
7.2 Evaluation Method  
 
Based on past BOT experience, the Hong Kong gov-
ernment has formulated the Kepner-Tregoe deci-
sion-making method that has been used in the recent 
projects. This method includes the following deci-
sion stages: formulating a “decision statement,” 
identifying and weighting decision alternatives (in 
terms of “MUST” and “WANT” criteria), generating 
alternatives, evaluating alternatives against the 
MUST and WANT criteria, and selecting the most 
suitable alternative. The decision statement provides 
the focus for the following steps and sets limits in 
the selection. The MUST and WANT criteria identify 
specific requirements of the decision. The MUST 
criteria function as a screen to eliminate fail-
ure-prone alternatives by a “Yes-or-No” judgment. 
Then, the remaining alternatives will be judged in 
their relative performance against WANT criteria. 
The WANT criteria give the evaluator a comparative 
picture of the remaining alternatives. 
 
To evaluate the tenders, the Kepner-Tregoe method 
also incorporates the evaluation methods of binary 
decision, simple scoring system, and multiattribute 
analysis.  
 
Zhang et al (2005) indicated that Kepner-Tregoe is a 
suitable method that can be adapted for competitive 
tendering of BOT projects although this method is 
more complicated than other evaluation methods 
such as simple scoring method, NPV method, or 
even the multiattribute analysis. It takes time and 
effort to determine appropriate decision statement, 
MUST/WANT criteria, and the relative importance 
of the WANT criteria. 
 
In Philippines, another evaluation method that is 
two-envelope method has been used to evaluate the 
tender proposals as requirement of BOT Law. This 
method includes two stages. The fist envelope 
evaluation involves the assessment of the technical, 
operational, environmental, and financing viability 
of the proposal as contained in the bidders’ first en-
velops vis-à-vis the prescribed evaluation criteria in 
the bidding documents. The second envelope evalua-
tion involves the assessment and comparison of the 
financial proposals of the bidders based on the 
evaluation stated in bidding documents. 
 
The main advantage of the two-envelope method is 
simple to apply. This method is also recommended to 
evaluate the BOT tendering by the Work Bank 
Guidelines (1998). Zhang et al (2004) mentions the 
two-envelope method as an appropriate method for 
tender evaluation of small and simple BOT projects. 
 
One characteristic of BOT projects is that financial 
aspects are the most important issue that needs to be 
considered in tender evaluation for BOT projects. 
Hence, the financial package is usually assigned a 
much higher weight than other evaluation packages. 
The two-envelop, therefore, will be more effective 
when is combined with NPV method. 
 
7.3 Evaluation Criteria 
 
Hong Kong government normally listed the evalua-
tion criteria for BOT projects in brief project. The 
main evaluation criteria have been used as below: 
 
a. The level and stability of the proposed toll regime 
b. The proposed methodology for toll adjustments 
c. The robustness of the proposed works program 
d. The financial strength of the tenderer and its 
shareholders, their ability to arrange and support 
an appropriate financing package, and the re-
sources they are able to devote to the project 
e. The structure of the proposed financing package 
including the levels of debt and equity, hedging 
arrangements for any interest rate and/or currency 
risks, and the level of shareholders’ support 
f. The proposed corporate and financing structure 
of the franchisee 
g. The quality of the engineering design; environ-
mental considerations; construction methods, in-
cluding traffic control, surveillance, and tunnel; 
electrical and mechanical installation; and venti-
lation and lighting systems 
h. The ability to manage, maintain, and operate ef-
fectively and efficiently 
i. Benefits to the government and community 
 
The key evaluation criterion for Hong Kong’s BOT 
projects is lowest tariff. It is noted that the franchise 
period was not considered a criterion since it was 
predetermined (30 years). 
 
With this key evaluation criterion, the Hong Kong 
government and the users have the benefits from the 
low tariffs. However, there are problems form the 
competition created by the cheaper tolls such as the 
case of CHT projects. The cheaper tolls than that of 
the subsequent projects in this project have affected 
the successful of the subsequent projects. The user 
interests in low tariffs and always uses the CHT, 
therefore, the traffic and also the revenue in the sub-
sequent projects are lower than forecast. 
 
To reduce the franchisee’s financial risks and en-
courage private involvement in future BOT projects, 
the Hong Kong government are considering a ‘‘re-
verse tender’’ system which has been practiced in the 
United Kingdom. In this system, the government sets 
up toll levels in phases during the franchise period, 
provides a certain amount of reserve fund during the 
selection of the tender, and asks the tenderer to offer 
what it can do for the project. In its proposal, the 
tenderer specifies what portion of the reserve fund it 
needs. From the government’s point of view, the less 
the amount of public money requested by the ten-
derer the more preferable its proposal. The tender is 
evaluated against this ‘‘less public money require-
ment’’ among other criteria. The actual public money 
requested by the winning tenderer becomes govern-
mental equity, and the government shares corre-
sponding risks and benefits (Zhang and Kumaras-
wamy 2001). 
  
Unlike Hong Kong, as above mention, Philippines 
government uses the two-envelop method for BOT 
tender evaluation, therefore, the evaluation are de-
pended the evaluation stage.  
 
The evaluation criteria for the fist stage are technical 
soundness, operational feasibility, environmental 
standards, project financing, and enhancements. The 
evaluation criteria for the second stage normally in-
clude one ore more of the following criteria: the low-
est proposed toll, fee, rental or charge at the start of 
project operation; the lowest present value of pro-
posed toll, fee, rentals and other charges for the pe-
riod covered by the contract; the lowest present 
value of government subsidy to be provided for the 
period covered by the contract; and the highest pre-
sent value of proposed payments to government such 
as concession fee, lease payments. 
 
The evaluation criteria in the second stage are the 
key evaluation criteria. Therefore the key evaluation 





Philippines’ BOT competitive procurement proce-
dure is not including the negotiation stage. After the 
financial evaluation, one tenderer will be selected as 
the winning tenderer to sign the contract for the pro-
ject with the Agency. 
 
Unlike Philippines, Hong Kong’s BOT competitive 
procurement procedure is including the negotiation 
stage. After the tender evaluation, the government 
may shortlist to a few tenderers to seek further clari-
fication, detailed evaluation, and negotiation, and 
may require the shortlisted tenderers to submit a 
draft construction contract, designer’s appointment 
agreement, checker’s appointment agreement, and 
relevant warranty agreements for review. 
 
During the negotiation stage, the shortlisted tender-
ers are required to have all the necessary expertise 
and personnel readily available for prompt responses 
to queries, requests for information, clarifications, 
submitting revised proposals, and participating in 
negotiations. Tender assessments are updated as the 
negotiation process proceeds and follows tenderers’ 
submission of revised proposals. Once the final as-
sessment is completed the executive committee of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gov-
ernment is asked to endorse the selection of the pre-
ferred tenderer for further negotiations on the final 
terms and conditions of the project agreement, and 
for the draft of the enabling ordinance. 
 
The evidence from Hong Kong’s experience is that 
the negotiations have resulted in major reductions in 
bid prices and most conflicts between concession-
aires and governments have been resolved through 
negotiation. 
 
9. UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS TREAT-
MENT 
 
As above mention, Hong Kong and Philippines gov-
ernment also accept the unsolicited projects and the 
main issues against unsolicited projects are the lack 
of competition. 
 
To resolve this issue, after the approval of the unso-
licited project, the Hong Kong government has pub-
lished the project to call the competitive tendering. 
An example of this solution is the EHC project. After 
the proposal of Kumagai Gumi was received and 
accepted, the competitive tendering has been issued 
by the government of Hong Kong. There were then 
nine tenderers including Kumagai Gumi participat-
ing the tendering. 
 
Unlike Hong Kong, the Philippines government 
wants to overcome this issue by the way of the Swiss 
challenge or price test (WB 1998): “the agency 
awarding the project must invite comparative pro-
posals to any unsolicited proposal it has received. 
The invitation to tender must be published in a 
newspaper of general circulation for at least three 
weeks. The published invitation must inform poten-
tial bidders where to obtain tender documents, how-
ever, proprietary information contained in the origi-
nal proposal is confidential and may not be disclosed 
in the tender documents. Competitors have 60 days 
to submit competitive proposals. If a lower-priced 
proposal is received, the original proponent has 30 
days to match it and win the contract. Otherwise, the 
award goes to the lower bidder.” In theory, it is good 
solution, however, in practical it is ineffective. One 
main reason for this ineffectiveness from potential 
tenderers is that period of time to submit other pro-
posals is short; 60 days are not enough to prepare 
one proposal. The expert recommendation is that 
challengers should be given s long time as the exten-
sion of the challenge period from 60 to 120 days 
(PIDS 2002). 
 
10. CONCLUSION  
 
The paper conducted through comparative examina-
tion of Hong Kong and the Philippines practical im-
plementation in competitive procurement procedures 
of BOT projects led the following recommendation 
to be considered when formulating or revising the 
BOT procurement systems. 
 
First, the project identification should be carefully 
prepared by the government. A good project could 
attract the strong private investors to participate in 
infrastructure, and give the benefits to the private 
investors as well as the government and the users. 
Hong Kong’s experience indicated that some current 
BOT projects such as TCT and WHC are in trouble 
because of the not good planning in system of toll 
road and government-tolled. 
 
Second, clear statement of criteria and procedures in 
each process is recommended. The good example for 
that is Philippines’s BOT Law. It clearly provides the 
details of the processes and of the responsibility of 
each related authority in project identification and 
tendering. 
 
Third, a transparent and competition tendering proc-
esses should be conducted. This issue has been con-
firmed by Hong Kong’s experience through their 
implementation in BOT tunnel projects. 
 
The last, the government should consider special 
procedures to handle unsolicited proposals that may 
result form a private sector’s identification of an in-
frastructure need it can satisfy. Unsolicited proposals 
may also facilitate innovative concepts in term of 
technology, finance, and management. The Philip-
pines’ “Swiss challenge” could become appropriate 
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